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APPLICATION OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROCEDURES ACT OF 1976 TO
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK
AT OWENS V CUR TIS
Russell B. Kinner,* Peter Drymalski, * and Sheila M. Barry***
The Council of the District of Columbia enacted the District of Colum-
bia Consumer Protection Procedures Act of 1976 (Act)' to accomplish the
broad purposes of eliminating deceptive business practices and promoting
fair practices throughout the community.' The Act established the Office
of Consumer Protection (OCP),3 a "mini-FTC," to investigate and adjudi-
cate consumer complaints about unfair or deceptive trade practices,' and
* Trial attorney in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and former con-
sumer specialist for the Neighborhood Legal Services Program. B.A. 1972, Ohio State Uni-
versity; J.D. 1976 Antioch School of Law. Member of the District of Columbia Bar, Div. 1I,
Committee on Consumer Affairs.
** Staff attorney with the Neighborhood Legal Services Program and former Director
of the Prince William County Office of Consumer Affairs. B.A. 1971, Carleton College; J.D.
1975, Georgetown University Law Center. Member of the District of Columbia Bar, Div. II,
Committee on Consumer Affairs.
*** Member of the Catholic University Law Review. B.S. 1966, Boston College; M.Ed.
1970, University of Virginia; J.D. 1983, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901 (1981).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(b) (1981).
3. On March 31, 1983, the District of Columbia Office of Consumer Protection was
dissolved and its functions transferred to the new District of Columbia Department of Con-
sumer and Regulatory affairs (DCRA). See Mayor's Reorganization Order No. 1, 30 D.C.
Reg. 374 (Jan. 21, 1983). DCRA has the responsibility for licensing numerous businesses in
the District, including those in the real estate industry, and monitoring their compliance
with District of Columbia regulations and statutes. Although the exact configuration of
DCRA's consumer protection function has not been permanently structured at this time, the
compliance and enforcement branches will police a merchant's conduct under the Act.
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(b) (1981). When a consumer files a complaint with
OCP. any pending trial court action must cease until OCP has acted on the complaint. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(4) (1981). OCP cannot award damages for personal injury of a
tortious nature. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3903(c)(1) (1981). In all other circumstances, OCP
may provide a remedy for the consumer's injury and also penalize a merchant for violations.
OCP may fine a merchant S 1,000 for each unlawful trade practice. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
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created a supplementary private right of action.5 The broad sweep of the
Act's provisions gives OCP wide authority to investigate and eradicate un-
lawful trade practices. The OCP can prohibit or otherwise remedy trade
practices contravening any of the provisions of the Act or violating any
other statute, regulation, rule of common law, or other law of the District
of Columbia.6
OCP used the Act's broad coverage to promote fair business practices in
every category of consumer transaction until the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals unexpectedly held in Owens v. Curtis7 that the sale of
residential real estate is not a consumer transaction within the scope of the
Act. In Owens, a purchaser of a single family residence sued the prior
owner under section 5 of the Act alleging that during negotiations she had
misrepresented the condition of the basement of the house.8 The court
held that the Act did not apply to real estate transactions.9 Without expla-
3905(g)(4) (1981). The merchant may also be assessed OCP's investigation and litigation
costs. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(i)(3) (1981).
Thus, the Council intended to empower OCP with broad jurisdiction and powerful en-
forcement tools forming in essence a "mini-FTC" to attain the Act's goals. See Council of
the District of Columbia, Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, Report on
Bill 1-253, at 2 (Mar. 24, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report]; see also J. Rogers,
Mayor's Comments on Bill 1-187, at I (Nov. 18, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Mayor's Com-
ments]; M. Freeman, Memorandum to Council Chairman on Bill 1-187, at 6 (Dec. 4, 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum to Council Chairman]. Bill 1-253 was initially intro-
duced as Bill 1-187. Hearings were held on Bill 1-187. Bill 1-187 was vetoed by Mayor
Washington because it required that the Director's position be filled by a District resident.
Bill 1-253 deleted this requirement and was passed by the Council and approved by the
Mayor without any additional hearings. See Committee Report at I.
5. Additionally, the Act also creates an effective private right of action for consumers.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981). If the consumer is injured by a merchant's viola-
tion of District of Columbia law, he may sue for treble damages, injunctive relief, punitive
damages, or any other appropriate relief, and reasonable attorneys fees. See Note, D. C
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 642 (1978).
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(b)(2) (1981); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3903(a)(13)
(1981). A trade practice is any economic act between a merchant and a consumer involving
consumer goods or services. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(a)(6) (1981); see Committee Re-
port, supra note 4, at 14. A merchant is defined as the direct or indirect supplier of the goods
and services. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(a)(3) (1981); see Committee Report, supra note 4,
at 13. The Act gives consumer goods and services an all-inclusive definition. Goods and
services are broadly defined as any and all parts of the economic output of society including
credit, franchises, business opportunities and services of all types. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
3901(a)(7) (1981). When used as an adjective, "consumer" describes "anything, without ex-
ception" that is primarily for personal, household, or family use. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
3901(a)(2) (1981).
7. 432 A.2d 737 (D.C. 1981).
8. Id. at 738.
9. Id at 739. The court also barred recovery on an alternative theory of common law
fraud because appellant had failed to prove reliance on the misrepresentations.
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nation, the court simply concluded that the Act did not apply to sales of
real estate because the adjective "consumer" does not include within its
scope the purchase of real property used primarily for personal or family
use. Unless narrowly construed, the Owens decision will remove the sale
of residential property from the Act's purview, thereby depriving the con-
sumer of the Act's protection in transactions involving the consumer's sin-
gle largest purchase.
Owens should be read narrowly because the court's decision rests on an
incomplete record that does not include information which is essential to
an accurate interpretation of the actual intended breadth of the Act, i.e.,
the interrelationship of statutory language, the Act's legislative history and
context, OCP's interpretation of the Act and considerations of public pol-
icy."° Owens should be narrowly limited to its facts by courts confronted
with the issue of the Act's application to residential real estate sales, coop-
erative and condominium sales, home improvement contracts and mort-
gage credit. The facts in Owens did not raise the issue of the Act's
application to these residential real estate transactions, but only the limited
question of whether the Act applies to the one-time sale of residential real
estate by one individual to another. Owens should be viewed as simply
standing for the proposition that the Act does not apply to any nonmer-
chant transactions. Owens should not be extended to exclude sales of resi-
dential real estate, apartment sales, home improvement sales or mortgage
credit when the goods or services are offered to the consumer by a
merchant.
Although ignored by the court in Owens, an authoritative body of case
law in the District of Columbia alters the traditional notion that a mean-
ingful distinction exists between real and personal property. This custom-
ary distinction between real and personal property would prevent
consumers involved in real estate sales from receiving the benefit of pro-
tections available under the laws governing other consumer contracts. In
Javins v. First National Realty Corp. ," the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit abrogated the rigid doctrines of tradi-
tional real property law, holding that under modern contract law a war-
ranty of habitability is implied in all leases of urban dwellings. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, building upon this holding, ap-
plied the law of products liability to the sale of a new cooperative apart-
10. The Court acknowledged that neither it nor the parties were able to locate materials
which illuminated the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia. Id at 738 n. 1.
11. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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ment in Berman v. Watergate West, Inc. 12 The Berman court found no
meaningful difference between the mass production and sale of homes and
the mass production and sale of other consumer merchandise. 13
Recognizing the definitional language of the Act and interpreting this
language under the trend established by Javins and Berman, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia has permitted consumers
to seek protection under the Act in transactions involving residential real
property. In Kearney v. Met Realty, Inc., the court permitted a homeowner
to amend her complaint to allege that the mortgage holder's enforcement
of an undisclosed, balloon payment provision in a deferred purchase
money mortgage was an unconscionable trade practice prohibited by the
Act. 4 The court in Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage Investment Corp.,
awarded the homeowner attorney's fees under the Act when she success-
fully set aside a second mortgage which had been fraudulently denomi-
nated as a "business" loan.' 5 Neither court questioned the modern
judicial view applying consumer protection laws to real estate transactions.
In 1981, another panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in
Howard v. Riggs National Bank, examined the Act's language and legisla-
tive history and, contemporaneously with the Owens court, interpreted the
Act's unlawful trade practices section to apply only to merchants.' 6 In
Howard, appellant brought suit in the superior court, charging Riggs Na-
tional Bank with violating the Consumer Act because the bank had made
misrepresentations regarding a building contractor's reputation.' 7 Since
the bank did not meet the definition of merchant, in these circumstances
12. 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978). The Berman court repeatedly referred to Ms. Berman
as a consumer.
13. Id at 1359.
14. Civ. A. No. 80-1349, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 1981).
15. 529 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, No. 81-1391, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19,
1982): see also Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage Inv. Corp., 488 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1980). In
1981, the Virginia legislature attacked the fraudulent "business purpose" loan practice head-
on by tightening its usury statute to eliminate the binding effect given to handwritten busi-
ness certificates, VA. CODE § 6.1-330.44 (Supp. 1982), and clarified the consumer protection
statute's application to deceptive practices involving mortgage credit. VA. CODE § 59.1-
200(P) (1981); see also Shook v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 627 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
16. 432 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C. 1980). The statute states that it is unlawful for "any per-
son" to engage in an unlawful trade practice. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (1981). "Person"
is defined in the Act as an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, cooperative, association
or any other organization, legal entity or group of individuals however organized. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-3901(1) (1981); see also Committee Report, supra note 4, at 17. The "any
person" language in the Act's unlawful trade practices section was very likely intended by
the Council to clarify that the merchant's agents or co-conspirators are liable for violating
the Act. Application of the Act to a merchant's agents or co-conspirators was not raised by
the facts in Howard.
17. 432 A.2d at 705.
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the court held that the Act did not apply.'I Significantly, this panel of the
court of appeals did not decide the issue on the grounds that home im-
provement transactions were outside the scope of the Act. With the excep-
tion of Owens, therefore, case law in the District of Columbia has
eliminated the traditional distinction between real and personal property
when consumers seek to remedy damage caused by a merchant.
Additionally, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the Act
consistent with the legal philosophy pronounced in Javins and gave OCP
broad authority to eradicate unlawful trade practices.19 The Council cre-
ated the OCP because it was dissatisfied with a predecessor agency, the
District of Columbia Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA). OCA was given
broad authority to "promote fair business practices within the [District of
Columbia] business community."2 The jurisdiction of OCA's consumer
education program was not limited to transactions involving personal
properties, OCA had virtually no regulatory or enforcement authority ex-
cept in the area of retail credit and consumer goods repair.2 ' The primary
purpose of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act
of 1976 was to shift the emphasis of the District's consumer protection ac-
tivities from merely a broad spectrum of consumer education to com-
plaint-handling and law enforcement throughout this same spectrum
under the new agency.22
The Council of the District of Columbia also intended to provide OCP
with the jurisdiction afforded other state and local consumer protection
agencies in the metropolitan area. 23 The consumer protection statutes of
both Maryland and Virginia have uniformly confined the scope of their
protection to purchases of goods or services that are "primarily for per-
sonal, household or family use."'24 These statutes, as well as the Federal
18. Id. at 709.
19. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(b)(2) (1981).
20. Commissioner's Order No. 73-225 (Oct. 3, 1973) as amended Commissioner's Order
No. 74-156 (July 17, 1974).
21. Committee Report, supra note 4, at 5.
22. Committee Report, supra note 4, at 7. The new OCP was intended to be a mini-
FTC with broad powers to investigate and punish unlawful trade practices. Committee Re-
port. supra note 4, at 2; Mayor's Comments, supra note 4, at I; Memorandum to Council
Chairman, supra note 4, at 5. The Federal Trade Commission has broad authority to inves-
tigate all deceptive or unfair trade practices in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976 &
Supp. 1981). The FTC actively investigates and prosecutes deceptive practices involving
sales of real estate to individuals for primarily personal, household, or family use. See, e.g.,
Horizon Corp., 97 FTC 464 (1981); Cavanaugh Communities Corp., 93 FTC 559 (1979);
GAC Corp., 84 FTC 163 (1974).
23. Memorandum to Council Chairman, supra note 4, at 3.
24. See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1980 & Supp. 1981); Mary-
19831
Catholic University Law Review
Truth-in-Lending Act, apply to sales of residential real estate by
merchants and to any other consumer transactions involving residential
real estate-i.e., condominium and cooperative sales, apartment rentals,
home improvements and mortgage credit25-as well as to the purchase of
consumer goods and services. The application of these statutes to transac-
tions involving real property was accomplished by various drafting meth-
ods. Maryland includes real property in its definition of sale. "'Sale'
includes any: (1) sales of. . . real property."26 Virginia accomplishes the
same result by defining goods to include tangible or intangible real or per-
sonal property or both.27 On the other hand, the Federal Truth-in-Lend-
ing Act's application to real estate transactions was accomplished by a
more indirect method. The definition of consumer refers simply to trans-
actions involving the extension of unsecured credit or credit secured by an
interest in property. This credit must be used primarily for personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes.28 In the exemption section, the drafters indi-
cated that the term "property" was intended to include real estate as well
as merchandise. This section excludes credit transactions in which the 'to-
tal amount to be financed exceeds $25,000, except where the transaction
involves real property.29
In order to give the new OCP the necessary jurisdiction to carry out its
mandate, the Council passed the District of Columbia Consumer Protec-
tion Procedures Act of 1976. The new legislation was drafted in a manner
similar to the Virginia statute and the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Act con-
tains a broad definition of goods and services including, by implication,
transactions involving real property.3" The exemption section excludes
from OCP's jurisdiction the narrow category of landlord-tenant rela-
land Consumer Protection Act, MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-101(d) (1975); Virginia
Consumer Protection Act, VA. CODE § 59.1-198(A) (1982).
25. See, e.g., Beard v. Gress, 90 1l. App. 2d 622, 413 N.E.2d 448 (1980); Nash v.
Hoopes, 332 A.2d 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975). See generally Blumberg, Application of State
Consumer Protection Acts to Landlord Tenant Practices, 15 Clearinghouse Rev. 399 (1981).
The Blumberg article contains an appendix indicating whether each state's consumer protec-
tion statute applies to real estate transactions. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission
has found that the sale of undeveloped residential lots purchased as an investment was "pri-
marily for personal, household, or family use." See Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. at 467.
26. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-101(i) (1975 & Supp. 1982).
27. VA. CODE § 59.1-198(B) (1982). See also MONT. CTY. MD. CODE § 11.1 (1981); PR.
GEO. CTY. MD. CODE § 2-142(a), (b) (1981).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
30. Goods and services "means any and all parts of the economic output of society, at
any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer
credit, franchises, business opportunities, and consumer services of all types. D.C. CoDE
ANN. § 28-3901(a)(7) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
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tions.3" Neither the Act's legislative history, nor its language, indicates any
intention to limit the transactional jurisdiction of OCP beyond the specific
exclusions mentioned in the Act. In fact, the broad definition of goods and
services in the Act was intended by its drafters to be all-inclusive. 32 The
drafters also gave OCP broad authority to remedy any unlawful business
activity injuring consumers. The Act states that OCP can assert jurisdic-
tion over a trade practice that violates "any statute, regulation, rule of
common law, or other law of the District of Columbia. ' 33 Among the laws
of the District of Columbia over which the drafters intended to extend
OCP jurisdiction, are the usury statute, pertaining to mortgage credit
laws,34 the home improvement regulations and statutes governing real es-
tate brokers.35
The Act's inclusion of residential housing transactions as goods and
services is also supported by examining two other sections of the statute.
The Council specifically excluded landlord-tenant relations from OCP's
31. The exclusion of landlord-tenant relations was intended to eliminate any regulatory
overlap between OCP and District of Columbia housing agencies, such as the District of
Columbia Rental Housing Commission. This language should not exclude business prac-
tices unrelated to landlord-tenant relations like false advertising and unconscionable prac-
tices. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
32. Simon, Guide to the Consumer Protection Act, 2 DISTRICT LAW. 45 n.2 (1977). Mr.
Simon was legislative assistant to Councilmember John A. Wilson (D-Ward 2) and served
on the Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs during the drafting, committee
review and passage of the Act. He later became a member of OCP's legal staff. Mr. Simon
indicates in his article that the definition of goods and services was drafted to encompass the
definition of goods and services used by the Commerce Department to calculate the gross
national product. The Commerce Department defines goods and services as any and all
parts of the economic output of society, at any point in the economic process.
The value of residential real estate and residential rental property, as well as the value of
other consumer services and merchandise, appears in the Commerce Department's calcula-
tion of GNP. Rents and the rental value of owner-occupied homes are included in GNP as
personal consumption expenditures. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HANDBOOK OF CYCLICAL
INDICATORS 50 (1977).
While the extension of consumer credit does not create any new wealth, i.e., value, for
inclusion in the GNP, the cost of obtaining residential mortgage financing appears in the
GNP. Since the principal amount of the loan is not included in the GNP, the Act's defini-
tion of goods and services was drafted to include consumer credit specifically. The acquisi-
tion and building costs of new housing and the costs of major home repairs and renovations
are also included in the GNP as private domestic investment. Id at 5 1. This broad defini-
tion of goods and services is just one indication that the drafters intended to include residen-
tial real estate transactions within OCP's jurisdiction.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(b)(2) (1981); see also D.C. CODE ANN..§ 28.3903(a)(13)
(1981). A trade practice is any economic act between a merchant and a consumer involving
goods and services. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901(a)(6) (1981); see Committee Report, supra
note 4, at 16-17.
34. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3307 (1981); D.C. Reg. 74-21, 21 D.C. Reg. 285 (1974).
35. Simon, Guide to the D.C. Consumer Protection Act, 2 DISTRICT LAW. 46 (1977).
19831
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jurisdiction.36 This exclusion must be necessary to the statutory structure
or it would not appear.37 Thus, where the Council meant to limit OCP
jurisdicton, it did so expressly. Additionally, in 1979 the Council expressly
gave OCP the jurisdiction to hear complaints under a statute regulating
rental housing locators. 38 This recent legislation evidences the Council's
continuing intention to include trade practices involving residential hous-
ing within the ambit of the Act.3 9 These provisions, and the intention of
the Act's drafters, led District of Columbia Corporation Counsel and OCP
to conclude that consumer complaints against the real estate industry were
within OCP's jurisdiction.
In addition to any legislative indication of an act's coverage, an execu-
tive agency's4" interpretation of its seminal statute is entitled to a high de-
gree of deference from the courts." In the District, the interpretations of
the Corporation Counsel and the OCP "are entitled to weight as construc-
tion of the District of Columbia Code unless plainly unreasonable or con-
trary to ascertainable legislative intent."
4 2
The first OCP Director, Edith Barksdale Sloan, requested an opinion
from Corporation Council about the Act's application to residential real
estate transactions. Corporation Counsel, John R. Risher, Jr., advised her
that OCP had jurisdiction over the "trade practices of the real estate indus-
try."43 Under this authority OCP took an active role in regulating the
trade practices of the real estate industry" through enforcement proce-
36. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3903(c)(2)(A) (1981). See also supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
37. 2A C. SANDS & J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
38. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(Z) (1981).
39. Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981). The Court reasoned that the
1980 amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act were relevant to an interpretation of statu-
tory language enacted in 1968. See also K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.14
(2d ed. 1979).
40. The OCP is an independent agency and not under the aegis of any other branch of
the District of Columbia Government.
41. Ford Motor Credit v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 557 (1980) (Federal Reserve Board).
42. Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
43. 1 Op. Corp. Counsel 485 (1977). The Corporation Counsel relied upon two sections
of the statute: the broad definition of consumer, which describes anything, without exception,
which is primarily for personal, household or family use, and the lack of an exclusion from
OCP's jurisdiction to reach this conclusion. Id. This latter notion is supported by the fact
that where the D.C. Council wished to limit OCP jurisdiction it did so expressly.
44. The second largest category of complaints received by OCP involves home improve-
ment contractors, perhaps as many as one thousand each year. Conversation with Paul G.
Ruiz, Home Improvement Advisor for District of Columbia Office of Consumer Protection.
Extensive home improvements traditionally invoke the laws governing real, rather than per-
sonal property. See G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROP-
[Vol. 32:851
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dures,45 until the Court of Appeals' decision in Owens v. Curtis.46
In March 1978, Gloria Owens examined a single family residence
owned by Mae S. Curtis and was told by Ms. Curtis that the loose tiles in
the basement were due to the age of the floor.47 Subsequently, Ms. Owens
signed a contract and, after settlement, found that the damaged tiles were a
result of flooding. After making this discovery, Ms. Owens sued Ms. Cur-
tis for committing an unlawful trade practice.48 The Superior Court, how-
ever, dismissed the action, deciding that the Act did not extend its
protection to real estate transactions. 9
ERTY § Z-69 (1964 & Supp. 1980). But see Etta v. Seaboard Enterprises, Inc., 674 F.2d 913
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (whether home solicitation occurred in sale of carpet and contract for home
repairs was a question of fact); McDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (seller's express warranty regarding carpet installation to home buyer is not sale of real
property); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1977) (sewer repair by
builder is separate from sale of real estate). See generally NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 2.2.5 (Boston 1982).
OCP is understandably proud not only of its enforcement record in this complaint cate-
gory but also of its legislative initiatives in this area. D.C. Office of Consumer Protection,
1980 Annual Report at 16-17 (Jan. 1981). In recognition of OCP's expertise in real estate
transactions, Mayor Walter E. Washington designated OCP as the agency responsible for
enforcement of limited warranties given to home buyers by real estate firms to avoid the
"speculation" tax, an extremely high tax on the sale of residential real property held six
months or less. 25 D.C. Reg. 2369 (1978) (statute has expired by its own terms); see D.C.
CODE ANN. § 47-1419 (1981). OCP has been involved in a massive investigation of real
estate firms which provided these warranties and reneged on their obligations to make
repairs.
45. 1980 D.C. Office of Consumer Protection Ann. Rep. 4.
46. 432 A.2d 737 (D.C. 1981).
47. Id at 738.
48. Ms. Owen's unlawful trade practice claim did not require her to prove that she
relied on Ms. Curtis' material misrepresentation. "It shall be a violation of [the Act], whether
or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, for any person to: . . .
misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead." D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
3904(e) (emphasis added). Thus, a merchant commits an unlawful trade practice regardless
of whether or not the consumer relies on the trade practice in making his purchase, or
whether or not he is damaged by the trade practice. This language was adopted because
sophisticated consumers, who can avoid incurring actual damages, often recognize unlawful
business practices and complain. These consumers are permitted to enforce the Act for the
benefit of less sophisticated consumers who may be injured when they fail to detect the
unlawful practices. This standard also permits OCP to initiate investigations of deceptive
practices which are detected by means other than the receipt of a complaint from a con-
sumer. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3907(a)(1) (1981).
These broad prohibitions in the Act pass constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Pennington v.
Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 688-90 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1980); see generally NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, supra note 44, at § 7.5. FTC orders issued under its broad "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practice" standard have been upheld by the courts. See F.T.C. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385-87 (1965); Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th
Cir. 1976).
49. Owens, 432 A.2d at 738.
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Affirming the Superior Court decision, the Court of Appeals quoted sec-
tion 2(a)(6) of the Act that defines a trade practice as "any act which [af-
fected] . . . consumer goods or services." '5 The court further stated that
"consumer good" describes "anything which is primarily for personal,
household, or family use."'" The court peremptorily concluded that the
sale of real estate was not within the meaning of "primarily for personal,
household or family use".52 The Owens court departed from modem case
law without adequately considering statutory language, the Act's legisla-
tive history, or the OCP's interpretation of the Act.
In Javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit discarded the ancient distinctions between residential real es-
tate transactions and transactions involving other more conventional
consumer goods and services." Following Javins, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in Berman held that products liability law was appli-
cable to the sale of an apartment or cooperative.54 Moreover, the court's
decision in Owens departs from two recent federal district court decisions,
Greene and Kearney. These cases applied the Act to homeowners' suits
involving credit transactions.55
In addition, the court's definition of "consumer", as not including the
sale of real estate, ignored the plain meaning of "consumer" as that term
has been used in scores of remedial statutes in the last decade. Real estate
transactions are protected under the Maryland, Virginia, and federal con-
sumer protection statutes.
The court's decision is also inconsistent with the legislative history and
subsequent agency interpretation of the Act. Legislative history indicates
that the drafters intended to define broadly "goods and services" to in-
clude real estate transactions.56 The drafters' intent is best evidenced by its
pointed exclusion of only one category of real estate transactions: land-
lord-tenant relations.5 7 The Owens court's holding that real property sales
were not within the scope of the Act's coverage is also contrary to the
Council's purpose of giving OCP broad authority.58 Moreover, the Owens
court did not ask Corporation Counsel or OCP whether it had construed
the Act to include sales of residential property. If the court had requested
50. Id at 739 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2(a)(6) (1978)).
51. Id at 739 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2(a)(2) (1978)).
52. Owens, 432 A.2d at 739.
53. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1071.
54. Berman, 391 A.2d at 351.
55. Greene, 529 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1981); Kearney, Civ. A. No. 81-1349, slip op. at 3.
56. See supra notes 22-25.
57. See supra note 36-37 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 14.
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information from OCP, it would have been informed not only of its broad
interpretation of the Act, but also of OCP's activities on behalf of individ-
ual homeowners. 59
Since the court's decision rests on an incomplete record that did not in-
clude information essential to an accurate interpretation of the actual
breadth of the Act, Owens should be narrowly limited to its facts. The
facts in Owens did not raise the issue of the Act's application to real prop-
erty sales, cooperative and condominium sales, home improvement trans-
actions or mortgage credit offered by a merchant. Rather, the court
decided only the limited question of whether the Consumer Act applies to
the one-time sale of residential real estate by one individual to another.
Thus, Owens should be viewed as simply standing for the proposition, as
articulated by the court in Howard,60 that the Act does not apply to any
nonmerchant transactions. Owens should not be read to exclude sales of
residential real estate, home improvement sales, or mortgage credit when
the transaction involves a merchant. Such an application is inconsistent
with modem case law, legislative history and OCP's interpretation of the
Act.
In addition, public policy weighs heavily in favor of applying the Act to
residential real estate sales, cooperative and condominium sales, home im-
provement and mortgage credit offered by merchants. A residential real
property transaction is usually the single largest purchase a consumer will
ever make. The effect of an unfair business practice involving real estate
will cost the consumer more and its damaging effect will last longer than
any other consumer purchase.6'
In this free market environment, the real estate industry cannot present
a convincing argument that an act which prohibits deceptive practices is an
unnecessary governmental intrusion into the market. When deceptive
practices are left unchecked, consumer demand is misallocated to unscru-
pulous businesses because consumers act on imperfect information. The
real estate market is particularly susceptible to this market imperfection
since most consumers are one-time customers in transactions involving
large amounts of money. If OCP has jurisdiction over unlawful trade
practices in the real estate industry and it acts to eliminate them through
59. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
60. 432 A.2d 701 (D.C. 1981).
61. Based on a survey completed in 1977, 50% of the owner-occupied housing units in
the Washington Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (273,000 units) were purchased prior
to April 1970; 25% of owner-occupied homes have been the residence of the present owner
since 1960. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, ANNUAL HOUSING SUR-
VEY: 1977, at A-03 (Mar. 1980).
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enforcement and consumer education, then the free market system can op-
erate properly and allocational efficiency will increase.
These strong public policy reasons for including real estate transactions
in the Act's coverage are undermined by the court's decision in Owens.
Even though OCP reads Owens as applying only to residential real estate
sales and not to mortgage credit or home improvement, thirteen active in-
vestigations into real estate transactions have been dismissed as a result of
the decision.62 Therefore, even at this early date Owens has had a severe
impact on OCP's effectiveness.
The Owens court's statement that the scope of the Act's coverage does
not include the regulation of residential real estate sales is misguided. The
record in Owens did not adequately present the Act's scope. Indeed, the
court did not examine the language and interpretations of similar state and
local statutes or modem real property cases in the District of Columbia.
62. Telephone interview with Michael S. Blaher, Legal Technician, Office of Consumer
Protection (June 21, 1982). Mr. Blaher is now Legislative Analyst for the D.C. Department
of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. Also, few statutory schemes regulate the real estate
industry and many consumer protections have been repealed or are threatened by pending
legislation. For example, in the last two years mortgage credit regulation has become in-
creasingly dependent on free market forces. Title V of the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161
preempted state regulation of the interest rate which may be charged for credit secured by a
first lien on residential housing. The statute was amended in 1982 to loosen disclosure re-
quirements involving "creative" real estate financing arranged by real estate brokers. Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702, 96 Stat. 1469.
Therefore, when a real estate broker arranges financing extended by an individual residen-
tial seller to a residential buyer, the buyer does not receive any disclosure of credit terms
under the Truth-in-Lending Act. 47 Fed. Reg. 7391 (1982).
Federal mortgage regulators have also encouraged the origination of creative financing
packages by providing a secondary market to purchase these packages. Since December 20,
1978, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has initiated seven alternative mortgage instru-
ments (AMIs). See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336 (1978) (authorizes Variable Rate Mortgage, Gradu-
ated Payment Mortgage, and Reverse Annuity Mortgage); 45 Fed. Reg. 72,675 (1980)
(authorizes Renegotiable Rate Mortgage); 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (Adjustable Mortgage
Loan replaces VRM and RRM); 46 Fed. Reg. 37,625 (1981) (authorizes Graduated Payment
Adjustable Mortgage); 46 Fed. Reg. 51,893 (1981) (authorizes balloon payment adjustable
mortgages and home improvement loans). See generally 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 (1982). In addi-
tion, the United States Senate is considering legislation which may deregulate all mortgage
interest rate ceilings and exempt all consumer credit transactions secured by residential real
estate credit from federal disclosure requirements. The substance of this legislation was
initially proposed in the 97th Congress as S. 1406. See 127 CONG. REC. S6627 (daily ed.
June 22, 1981) (statement of Sen. Lugar). That bill never made it out of committee. Senator
Garn reintroduced the cited portions of S. 1406 the following October. 127 CONG. REC.
S 11265-66 (daily ed. Oct. 5-16, 1981) (statement by Sen. Garn). Again, the portion of the
bill eliminating rate ceilings died in committee. The remainder of the bill went into effect in
October 1982. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1469. The Council of the District of Columbia also has under consideration the
elimination of interest rate ceilings on junior mortgage credit. See Bill 4-290 (Jul. 6, 1981).
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Finally, the court did not even weigh considerations of public policy which
may support applying the Act to residential real estate transactions.
Future interpretations of the Act should follow OCP's enforcement pol-
icy, giving Owens a narrow reading limited to the facts presented to the
court. In any event, Owens should not exclude from the Act's protection
consumer transactions incidentally related to the sale of residential real
property. Home improvements, mortgage credit and apartment sales are
consumer transactions distinct from the sale of real property. The con-
sumer of residential real estate and related goods and services needs, and is
entitled to, the protection of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection
Act of 1976.

